

# **Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence**

**A Compendium of Best Practices**



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## Chapter 22

# The Role of International Organisations

International organisations have played a central role in driving the tremendous shift in worldwide attitudes about corruption that have taken place in the past twenty years. They have also played a major role in practical efforts to counter corruption through international conventions and standards, promoting good governance, monitoring and advocacy. While most of this work has focused on the areas of international business and development, there is now growing attention to the issue of corruption in the defence and security sectors. This is a natural extension of an increasing focus on defence governance over the past decade, itself being driven by the growing understanding in institutions like NATO that effective stewardship of resources is vital to ensuring successful operations.

International organisations—for the purposes of this chapter include inter-governmental organisations and global non-governmental organisations—have tremendous resources and know-how that can be valuable to officials or citizens who wish to make a contribution to combating corruption in their own institutions or society. This chapter aims to help such readers better understand the resources available, access them and use them effectively. It will first look at the various roles and approaches to combating corruption taken by international organisations, both overall and more specifically in the area of defence. It will then examine several prominent institutions more closely before considering how to best leverage the capabilities provided by these institutions to catalyse change in the national context.

## **Role of International Organisations: The Broad Context**

Until the early 1990s, corruption was viewed by most of the international business and development community as a regular (if not “normal”) transaction cost. In some Western countries, it was not unusual for corruption payments to be listed as legitimate business expenses for tax purposes. Nevertheless, for several decades there had been a growing understanding of the tremendous burden that corruption puts on development programs as well as its distortive economic effects. Debate surrounding the US Corrupt Foreign Practices Act of 1977, for example, noted that more than 400 US corporations had admitted to paying out in excess of \$300 million in corporate funds to foreign government officials – a reality that was not only unethical but also bad business, eroding confidence in the corporations in question and, by favouring private arrangements over efficiency, undermining the integrity of the free market system more

generally.<sup>1</sup> The tremendous corrosive effects of corruption were also brought home by the troubled “free-market” transition in Russia and other post-Soviet states, where privatisation programs recommended by well-meaning (but naïve) Western experts degenerated into wholesale theft of state assets. The creation in 1993 of Transparency International, whose founders were officials with direct experience in the damage that corruption causes to development, gave a voice to this growing awareness. Since that time, a growing network of national and international institutions have used education, lobbying and focused research to place the corruption problem—and the need to combat it—firmly on the world’s political agenda.

Today, dozens of major international organisations, inter-governmental organisations and global non-governmental organisations are now actively involved in efforts to counter corruption. They fill a number of important niches in the anti-corruption ecosystem (please note that due to space limitations the organisations mentioned for each niche are representative, not exhaustive):

*Developing and implementing anti-corruption agreements and standards* at the global and regional levels. Over a dozen of such agreements exist today, most notably the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which came into force in December 2005, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, signed in December 1997. Monitoring implementation of conventions is frequently an important role for institutions like the OECD, as is identifying and spreading good practice. Work is often supported through a network of organisations – for example, in Europe: the Council of Europe, GRECO (Group of States against Corruption), the European Commission and the OSCE Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities. In the Americas, the Organisation of American States works in support of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. There are also niche roles: the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) leads in combating money laundering through development and implementation of international standards; the World Trade Organisation incorporates an anti-corruption role in its Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement.

*Parliamentary assemblies* can help develop international agreements and approaches to countering corruption, lobby national adoption and monitor implementation. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is a prime example for its work regarding the Council of Europe Criminal & Civil Law Conventions on Corruption. Another prominent organisation, the Canadian-based Global Organisation of Parliamentarians against Corruption (GOPAC), supports national parliamentarians in protecting their own integrity by adherence to a code of conduct, as well as in effectively understanding and exerting their oversight role. Usefully, this includes performance indicators for parliamentary oversight. Other regional parliamentary assemblies, like the Asian Parliamentary Assembly, also address corruption issues.

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<sup>1</sup> Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, Legislative History – House Report, <http://10.173.2.10/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt.html>.

*Development banks* have become major players in anti-corruption efforts, both in order to maintain integrity of their own programs and, more broadly, to remove what is widely acknowledged as a serious impediment to economic and social development; corruption distorts the rule of law, weakens the institutions necessary for economic growth and undermines public services on which the poor are particularly reliant. Development bank programs often take a multi-faceted approach to countering corruption, building corporate governance and management in institutions receiving loans, increasing political accountability for spending of resources, and strengthening civil society's ability to demand action and monitor compliance. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are the two largest global players. In addition, regional development banks such as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank also have anti-corruption programs.

*Major non-bank international (and national) development organisations* have also increasingly targeted corruption as a part of the growing emphasis on good governance as essential to human development. Corruption is increasingly being targeted directly as its corrosive effects on governance have become better known. Institutions working to identify and spread good practice include the United Nations Development Program, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR). In this sense, NATO also works as a "development" organisation, linking its anti-corruption programs to its interest in good security sector governance and democratic civil control.

*Coordinating law enforcement actions.* Global institutions like Interpol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) play a significant role in coordinating and complementing national anti-corruption efforts. In addressing what is one of its six priority areas for fighting crime, Interpol has developed codes of ethics and conduct for law enforcement officers, standards for police forces and a Police Integrity Survey to benchmark capabilities, collated a *Library of Best Practice* to assist corruption investigators, and established a group of national contact points on corruption. It also operates the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC) to facilitate, in conjunction with other international stakeholders, coordination and harmonisation of national and regional approaches to combating corruption. The UNODC and Interpol have agreed to open the world's first Anti-Corruption Academy, to be located near Vienna, Austria. The European Commission also has strong anti-corruption programs, as do some regional institutions, like law enforcement task forces in the Baltic Sea and Balkans areas.

*International professional organisations* often have programs to maintain integrity and fight corruption in their areas of responsibility. Examples of global organisations include the International Association of Judges, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Bar Association and the International Association of Prosecutors. There are also a number of regional organisations addressing audits; for example, the Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions.

**Box 22.1. List of International Organisations and Websites**

Asian Development Bank	<a href="http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/unit.asp">http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/unit.asp</a>
Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions	<a href="http://www.asosai.org">http://www.asosai.org</a>
Asian Parliamentary Assembly	<a href="http://www.asianparliament.org">http://www.asianparliament.org</a>
Council of Europe	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu">http://www.consilium.europa.eu</a>
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development	<a href="http://www.ebrd.com">http://www.ebrd.com</a>
European Commission	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu">http://ec.europa.eu</a>
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)	<a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org">http://www.fatf-gafi.org</a>
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces	<a href="http://www.dcaf.ch">http://www.dcaf.ch</a>
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)	<a href="http://www.ssrnetwork.net">http://www.ssrnetwork.net</a>
Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC)	<a href="http://www.gopacnetwork.org">http://www.gopacnetwork.org</a>
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)	<a href="http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/">http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/</a>
Inter-American Development Bank	<a href="http://www.iadb.org">http://www.iadb.org</a>
International Association of Judges	<a href="http://www.iaj-uim.org">http://www.iaj-uim.org</a>
International Association of Prosecutors	<a href="http://www.iap-association.org">http://www.iap-association.org</a>
International Bar Association	<a href="http://www.ibanet.org">http://www.ibanet.org</a>
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Anti-Corruption Commission	<a href="http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption">http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption</a>
International Commission of Jurists	<a href="http://www.icj.org">http://www.icj.org</a>
International Monetary Fund	<a href="http://www.imf.org">http://www.imf.org</a>
Interpol	<a href="http://www.interpol.int">http://www.interpol.int</a>
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)	<a href="http://www.nato.int">http://www.nato.int</a>
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)	<a href="http://www.oecd.org">http://www.oecd.org</a>
Organisation of American States	<a href="http://www.oas.org">http://www.oas.org</a>
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities	<a href="http://www.osce.org/eea">http://www.osce.org/eea</a>
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)	<a href="http://assembly.coe.int">http://assembly.coe.int</a>
Transparency International	<a href="http://www.transparency.org">http://www.transparency.org</a>
United Nations	<a href="http://www.un.org">http://www.un.org</a>
UNICORN	<a href="http://www.againstcorruption.org">http://www.againstcorruption.org</a>
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	<a href="http://www.unodc.org">http://www.unodc.org</a>
United Nations Development Program	<a href="http://www.undp.org">http://www.undp.org</a>
World Bank	<a href="http://www.worldbank.org">http://www.worldbank.org</a>
World Trade Organisation	<a href="http://www.wto.org">http://www.wto.org</a>
WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement	<a href="http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm#plurilateral">http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm#plurilateral</a>

*Advocacy and monitoring.* A number of international non-governmental organisations work to raise awareness and promote anti-corruption action, using both political and social pressure. With an international network and over 90 national chapters, Transparency International leads in this field. Its efforts are complemented by other institutions, such as the trade union organisation UNICORN and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a business association supporting an efficiently functioning global economy characterised by free and fair competition. The ICC has an Anti-Corruption Commission whose main objective is to encourage self-regulation by business in confronting issues of extortion and bribery, and to provide business input into international initiatives to fight corruption.

## The Link to Defence

The defence community's awakening to the importance of governance—and the direct threat that corruption makes to it—parallels that of the development community. The case of Partnership for Peace in Central and Eastern Europe illustrates this situation well. The 1990s saw hope for a rapid democratic, free-market transformation of post-communist states. Military-to-military engagement complemented that process by bringing military professionals together in common tasks of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. The number one task for cooperation and assistance programs at that time was therefore interoperability – the ability for military forces to have common (or at least compatible) understanding, procedures and technical capabilities needed to work side-by-side in joint operations. Democratic control of the armed forces as an issue was considered largely in terms of operational control.

The ensuing decade saw considerable progress in developing operational interoperability. However, as the 90s progressed it became clear that interoperability alone was only half of the equation: the other half was defence transformation – the development of new capabilities and methods that would match the requirements of modern operations. This drive toward transformation further accelerated when counter-terrorism missions became increasingly important following 9/11. Unlike interoperability, transformation could not be isolated as a “military-to-military” effort. On the contrary, it needed to be driven by new visions of policy, innovative planning and increased budget support. Yet while civilian democratic control was effectively in place in operational terms (i.e. the president as “commander-in-chief”), defence institutions responsible for policy, planning, resource allocation, etc. were weak in many countries. Without an effective civilian defence ministry to provide direction or lobby its interests, the military fell victim to its own inertia and the political class' apathy towards national security issues (and defence budgets).

This put the issue of security sector governance squarely on the defence cooperation agenda – a trend that was confirmed with the creation in 2004 of NATO's Partnership for Peace Defence Institution Building program. With good governance now firmly on the defence cooperation agenda, it was only a matter of time before countering corruption received due attention, in the form of NATO's program for Building Integrity and

Reducing Corruption (the sponsor of this compendium). This program sees countering corruption as an essential part of the reform process but retains its focus on developing positive dynamics of integrity, transparency and accountability as keys to effective defence management.

## Selected Institutions and Programs

The role of the *United Nations* in corruption is centred around implementation of the United Nations Convention on Corruption, which came into force in December 2005. The convention seeks to develop a common global language about corruption and an effective set of benchmarks for coherent implementation strategies. It sets out a four-point approach to combating corruption, including preventative measures, criminalisation, international cooperation and asset recovery.

The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) runs a Global Program against Corruption as a catalyst and a resource to help states effectively implement the provisions of the convention. It assists states with vulnerable developing or transitional economies by promoting anti-corruption measures in the public and private sector, including in high-level financial and political circles. Areas of work include the codification of good practice and policy, technical assistance to spread such good practices in the public and private sector and public awareness. Specific tools include a Judicial Integrity Group, a self-assessment checklist and a legislative guide for signatories to the convention.

Over the last few years, under pressure from media and member governments, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations has also increased its anti-corruption efforts, making a number of investigations and, on occasion, turning down troop contributions from countries that had a history of problems.

The *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)* is an international organisation of 31 countries committed to values of pluralist democracy based on the rule of law and the respect of human rights, adherence to open and transparent market economy principles and a shared goal of sustainable development.<sup>2</sup> The OECD has become a major hub for dialogue on globally significant issues and contributes to efforts for a stronger, cleaner and fairer world economy. Using one of the world's largest and most reliable sources of comparable statistics, it monitors trends, analyses and forecasts economic developments and researches social changes or evolving patterns in trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxation and public governance.

One of the important areas of the organisation's work is combating corruption. The latter threatens good governance, democratic process, sustainable development and

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<sup>2</sup> The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile (joined in January 2010), the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

fair business practices. By employing a multidisciplinary approach the OECD addresses corruption in business, taxation, development aid and governance in member countries and beyond. This includes combating the “supply side” of bribery, preventing bribery through export credits, denying tax deductibility of bribes, promoting responsible business conduct, preventing corruption in the public sector by building a robust integrity framework and improving governance through development assistance.<sup>3</sup>

The OECD helps countries prevent conflicts of interest and corruption in public service. It focuses on vulnerable areas like public procurement and contract management, lobbying and political-administrative interface. Based on review and analysis of good country practices, the OECD has developed policy instruments, implementation guidelines and practical tools to help policymakers and managers promote integrity and foster resistance to corruption in the public sector.

The centrepiece of the OECD anti-corruption efforts is the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) and related instruments that address issues of taxes, export credits, bilateral aid, multinational enterprises and public procurement.<sup>4</sup> The convention is a legally binding international treaty that addresses “active bribery” – the individuals or companies who promise, offer or give bribes to foreign public officials in order to gain or retain business advantages. All OECD member countries plus 7 non-member economies are parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention, pledging to make bribery of foreign public officials in international business a criminal offence under their national law and implement effective policies to prevent, detect, investigate and sanction foreign bribery.

By fighting to eliminate bribery of foreign public officials from competition for contracts and investment, the OECD is making a major contribution to levelling the playing field for transnational business, including the defence industry. A unique strength of the OECD anti-bribery instruments is their rigorous, peer-driven review carried out by the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Detailed monitoring reports evaluate countries’

### **Box 22.2. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and National Security Interests**

According to Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another state or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved. Article 5 acknowledges the possibility of prosecutorial discretion but limits such discretion to professional motives (e.g. the weight of evidence), excluding improper influence by concerns of a political nature. Applicability of Article 5 of the OECD Convention was tested in the UK when a major case involving the alleged bribery of a foreign public official was terminated, reportedly due to the need to safeguard national and international security.

<sup>3</sup> For more information, see: [www.oecd.org/corruption](http://www.oecd.org/corruption).

<sup>4</sup> OECD, “Key OECD Anti-Corruption Documents,” [www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_37447\\_41799402\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_2649_37447_41799402_1_1_1_1,00.html).

*Facts.* Between July 2004 and December 2006 the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigated allegations of bribery by BAE Systems in relation to the Al-Yamamah military aircraft contracts with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In October 2005, BAE sought to persuade the attorney general and the SFO to stop the investigation on the grounds that its continuation would adversely affect relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia and prevent the United Kingdom securing what it described as the largest export contract in the last decade. In July 2006, when the SFO was about to obtain access to Swiss bank accounts, what were discreetly described as "Saudi representatives" made a specific threat to the prime minister's chief of staff, Jonathan Powell: if the investigation was not stopped, there would be no contract for the export of Typhoon aircraft and the previous close intelligence and diplomatic relationship would cease. Ministers advised that those threats would likely be carried out, with grave consequences for the arms trade and for the safety of British citizens and service personnel. In light of what he regarded as a grave risk to life if the threat were carried out, in December 2006 the SFO director decided to stop the investigation. In April 2008, following a request for judicial review by two NGOs, the U.K. High Court found that the Al Yamamah investigation had been unlawfully terminated in what Lord Justice Moses and Mr. Justice Sullivan described as "a successful attempt by a foreign government to pervert the course of Justice in the United Kingdom." In July 2008, the House of Lords, the highest appellate court of law in the country, upheld the SFO's appeal and overturned the High Court decision, agreeing that the SFO director acted within the limits of allowed discretion and holding that the interpretation of applicability of Article 5 to national security considerations should be left to the OECD Working Group on Bribery.

*OECD Report.* In its examination report on the UK, the OECD Working Group on Bribery felt it inappropriate to interpret Article 5 in the context of a country report. The report focused instead on procedures related to Article 5 and reached the following conclusions: i) where the termination of a case could appear to be based on considerations prohibited under Article 5, prosecutors must apply a "strict scrutiny" test to ensure that permissible considerations are the real basis for the decision; ii) a case must not be terminated on national security grounds unless alternative solutions have been thoroughly explored as appropriate by the whole of government.

The case of discontinued investigation in the Al-Yamamah case uncovered a number of deficiencies in the UK system of investigation and prosecution of sensitive cases involving national interests, in particular in the conditions for applying prosecutorial discretion. It underlined the need for comprehensive reform of the UK outdated anti-bribery legislation. It also pointed to the need for further academic research and an authoritative interpretation of Article 5 of the OECD Convention with a view to clarifying the scope of exceptions to enforcement of the foreign bribery offence.

*Sources:* OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 2bis Report on the UK, [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf); The UK High Court judgment, [www.baillii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/714.html](http://www.baillii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/714.html); The UK House of Lords judgment, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080730/corner.pdf>; TI 2009 Progress Report on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, [http://www.transparency.org/news\\_room/in\\_focus/2009/oecd\\_pr\\_2009](http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/oecd_pr_2009).

implementation and enforcement of anti-bribery laws and policies. A mutual evaluation process creates peer pressure within the Working Group and motivates countries to ensure the highest level of compliance with the convention.

The *Council of Europe (CoE)/GRECO* exist to uphold and further pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The council's efforts to fight corruption are due to the threat corruption presents to the very foundations of these core values. CoE's approach consists of three interrelated elements: (1) setting European norms and standards; (2) monitoring compliance with the standards; and (3) capacity building offered to individual countries and regions, through technical cooperation programs.

The Council of Europe has developed a number of legal instruments addressing issues like criminalisation of corruption in the public and private sectors, liability and compensation for damage caused by corruption, conduct of public officials and the financing of political parties. These instruments are aimed at improving the capacity of states to fight corruption domestically as well as at the international level.

The monitoring of compliance with these standards is entrusted to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). GRECO was established in 1999 by the Council of Europe to monitor States' compliance with the organisation's anti-corruption standards. Currently it has 46 members, 45 European States and the United States of America. GRECO's objective is to improve the ability of its members to fight corruption. It does this through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure based on monitoring missions to test their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption standards, identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, and then prompt the necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for sharing best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption.

In July 2008, *NATO* launched a Trust Fund to build integrity and reduce corruption in defence establishments. The program seeks to increase national capacity using three principle tools:

- A self assessment tool designed to measure the current state of integrity and anti-corruption programs in defence establishments;
- Building integrity courses for civilian and military personnel;
- Development of a compendium to promote best practices (the one you are currently reading).

The Building Integrity Trust Fund is being implemented together with a number of partners, including the UK Defence Academy, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Transparency International.

The Trust Fund is a natural extension of NATO's Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building (PAP/DIB), which was launched in July 2004 to help partners develop and sustain efficient defence institutions that operate under democratic civilian control. The PAP/DIB established ten objectives (see Box 22.3) for nations building de-

fence institutions and took three major steps toward helping them achieve these objectives:

- Integrating defence institution building into the defence planning process for Partnership (PfP Planning and Review Process, or PARP);
- Developing activities to facilitate exchange of experience; for example a Reference Curricula that provides in-depth learning objectives and curriculum development support;
- Helping tailor and focus bilateral defence and security assistance programs.

The Trust Fund also helps nations to meet their international obligations, including implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the World Bank strategy on corruption, and anti-corruption instruments of other international and regional organisations.

### **Box 22.3. Objectives of the PfP Action Plan for Defence Institution Building**

The Action Plan's objectives include:

- Effective and transparent arrangements for the democratic control of defence activities;
- Civilian participation in developing defence and security policy;
- Effective and transparent legislative and judicial oversight of the defence sector;
- Enhanced assessment of security risks and national defence requirements, matched with developing and maintaining affordable and interoperable capabilities;
- Optimizing the management of defence ministries and other agencies which have associated force structures;
- Compliance with international norms and practices in the defence sector, including export controls;
- Effective and transparent financial, planning and resource allocation procedures in the defence area;
- Effective management of defence spending as well as of the socio-economic consequences of defence restructuring;
- Effective and transparent personnel structures and practices in the defence forces; and
- Effective international cooperation and good neighbourly relations in defence and security matters.

*Source:* Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int).

NATO's intensive security and defence cooperation with Ukraine has served as an incubator for innovative projects, under the framework of the Distinctive NATO-Ukraine Partnership. These may provide useful lessons that can be applied more widely.

One of the most successful innovations has been the creation in 1998 of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR). For over a decade, the JWGDR has helped Ukraine draw on NATO countries' experience in defence and security sector reform in formats from expert workshops to annual ministerial-level consultations. This has proven particularly valuable in helping Ukraine develop its reform agenda in ways that reflect international good practice and working together with NATO countries to manage international support for that agenda – including the development of a number of innovative programs tailored to Ukraine's requirements. This joint management has also included regular progress assessments.

A number of specific initiatives coming out of the JWGDR are worth noting:

- Expert support on key national security documents that form a road map for reform, including Defence Reviews in 2003 and 2009 and the National Security Strategy in 2006;
- Expert assistance on the development of "White Books" providing public transparency on policy and implementation for defence and the intelligence/security sector;
- Engagement of numerous allied technical advisors with Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, along with the creation of a Joint Coordinating Committee to manage efforts;
- Engagement with parliament on democratic control issues, including seminars, workshops, expertise on legislation and publication of the legislative co-dex on security and defence;
- The NATO-Ukraine Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control of the Intelligence Sector, which brought together dozens of intelligence officials and experts from NATO countries and Ukraine to discuss the functioning of intelligence agencies in democracies;
- A Professional Development Program that has trained hundreds of civilians working in Ukraine's defence and security institutions;
- A Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development to promote the role of civil society in defence and security affairs by linking experts from Ukraine and NATO countries.

Many of these efforts were implemented in close coordination with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

*The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)* is one of the world's leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). Established by the Swiss government in 2000, it operates as an international foundation with 53 member states. DCAF develops and pro-

motes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related research on SSR issues, and provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programs. It runs the following programs:

- Security Governance Program
- Government Advisory Program
- Parliamentary Assistance Program
- Civil Society Program
- Defence Reform Program
- Police Reform Program
- Border Security Program
- Intelligence Accountability Program
- Gender, Children and Security Program.

DCAF's priority geographical focus is on the Western Balkans and the Newly Independent States; however, it has been increasingly reaching out to the Middle East and parts of Africa, Latin America and Asia.

*Transparency International (TI)* is a non-partisan global network that brings together the international presence of a global NGO with the local capacities of its more than 90 national chapters. These chapters work to bring together relevant players from government, civil society, business and the media to promote transparency in elections, public administration, procurement and business. They also use advocacy campaigns to lobby governments to implement anti-corruption reforms.

TI helps these chapters with developing the skills, tools, experience, expertise and broad participation to fight corruption on the ground, as well as through global and regional initiatives.

The global priorities for TI are combating corruption in politics, public contracting and the private sector. They also support implementation of international anti-corruption conventions and work to alleviate poverty and support development. TI does not undertake investigations of alleged corruption or expose individual cases but at times will work in coalition with organisations that do.

Beginning in 2000, the UK chapter of TI began working to address corruption in the defence arena. The initial focus of this effort was in the area of arms exports, and TI brought together arms exporting governments and defence companies to consider what constructive measures might be taken to reduce corruption in this area. These ideas include the possibility of a defence consortium against corruption, strengthening the implementation of the OECD Convention, integrity pacts for procurement and closer work with other international organisations.

TI has recently begun working on a Trust Fund Project with NATO to explicitly address corruption and corruption risk in the defence sphere. It has also begun an initiative to better measure the effectiveness of effort of defence integrity programs.

## Leveraging International Organisations to Catalyze Change

A tremendous number of international organisations, inter-governmental organisations and global civil society institutions are involved in combating corruption. The challenge for the reform-minded defence official or citizen is how to use that know-how to catalyze positive change. The following three approaches have proven successful:

1. *International Standards*: The national institution seeking reform engages with an international institution that is a repository of an international standard. This could be an anti-corruption standard like the OECD, or it could be a standard of ethics like the UN Guidelines on Conflict of Interest for Public Officials, or a standard for the integrity of a process, like auditing. The goal is to publicly meet the standard using any feedback mechanisms to gain the prestige, workplace pride and improved effectiveness that meeting an international standard can bring. By working closely with the assessment team, inspections become an excellent opportunity not only for feedback but also to place difficult reforms on the agenda of senior officials.
2. *Joint Projects*: The national institution seeks assistance from the international organisation to address a specific issue that is important to the institution's leadership but beyond local means to implement unaided. The result is a joint program with joint management mechanisms – that is, implementation teams, steering boards to provide direction, joint assessments and joint reporting to a body where senior officials of both sides regularly attend. This can help lock domestic institutions into frameworks where they work according to international standards of integrity, transparency and accountability. Joint projects can also be an effective mechanism for transfer of norms, values and working methods. Transparency is improved as the free flow of information up the “Western” portion of the reporting chain forces local counterparts to match that accuracy and honesty of reporting (see the example in Box 22.4).
3. *Bridge-building*: Often there are actors within a national institution, or out in society, who are potential allies in building integrity with motivation and resources (at least human resources). However, the opportunity to meet may be limited due to the nature of bureaucracy or society – for example, mutual suspicion or bureaucratic regulation. International organisations can help these natural allies to meet, share knowledge and experience, gain confidence with each other and work together in a network. In this case, it is useful if the host government encourages international organisations to make broad links within society and the state apparatus in order to have the best information and contacts available to play “matchmaker.” International organisations are also usually well-placed to link domestic officials and non-governmental experts or activists to international counterparts. The development of this network can have a strong impact in at least two directions: 1) the creation of

a professional and well-integrated expert class; and 2) increased expertise in civil society, allowing for more effective independent monitoring.

#### **Box 22.4. NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Program**

In 2005, NATO and Ukraine identified a gap in training for defence officials. Military officers were regularly receiving training opportunities, abroad or in-country, but their civilian counterparts were not. This was leading to imbalances in the system.

Ukraine requested support to address the problem and in 2006 NATO and Ukraine created the NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Program, which was targeted at defence civilians. National sponsors were found and a program team was put in place at the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv. A Ukrainian officer from the MOD Personnel Department was seconded to the implementation team, reporting to the NATO-national program manager. In addition, a local management board was made that included representation from all major stakeholders: the MOD leadership (assistant to the minister), the MOD Personnel Department, the National Security and Defence Council, the UK special defence advisor (UK being lead nation on the project), the head of the NATO Liaison Office and the program manager. On behalf of the Management Board, the program manager presented 3–4 times a year to a steering committee of major donors in Brussels.

Training and education abroad are important parts of the program and to date over 1000 Ukrainian officials have attended courses – some in-country, some abroad. As these courses are in high demand, they come with significant corruption risk (which was already endemic in national selection procedures). In order to ensure the integrity of the process, the program instituted the following procedures:

1. Requirements for training are developed a year ahead of time based on MOD transformation objectives. This helped ensure that managers were motivated to send the right people to get the job done.
2. Training requirements are matched to courses and potential students (or at least postings) and presented in an annual plan to be approved by senior MOD leadership.
3. The program staff, working with the MOD, identifies a pool of possible candidates with the right prerequisites, the right position and the supervisor's permission. These candidates are subject to:
  - a) Competitive selection, including language testing and interviews, with the interview board made up of different stakeholders, and always at least one Ukrainian and one NATO official.
4. Joint management and ownership of the results, with regular assessment being provided to senior stakeholders.

On this latter point, the support of the defence leadership was crucial for maintaining the integrity of these decisions and in several cases resulted in significant punishment for those who tried to circumvent the regulations.

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In all these cases, the key enabling factor is people – dedication, trustworthiness and a good rapport between partners is crucial for success. For international organisations, the number one prerequisite for success is an in-country counterpart who can work patiently with all stakeholders, help smooth over differences, take a stand when necessary and—in the end—take ownership of the process, jointly at first, and then ideally gradually accepting increased responsibility for project implementation. There is a good chance that the reader, having made it this far in the compendium, may be just such a person.